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PRESERVING AN UNEQUAL ALLOCATION 
AND THE POTENTIAL PROMISE OF 
PROGRESSIVE PROSECUTION 
Savanna R. Leak*  
In the United States, the relative allocation of peremptory challenges 
afforded to the defense and prosecution is at once in a state of paralysis and 
flux. The federal system maintains an unequal allocation of peremptory 
challenges between the defense and prosecution in noncapital offenses, while 
many states have moved toward equalization of the number of peremptory 
challenges afforded to each side over the last few decades. Currently, only 
five states and the federal system have retained an allocation of peremptory 
challenges that affords the defense a greater number of peremptory 
challenges in noncapital offenses. Further, only nine states and the federal 
system maintain an unequal allocation of peremptory challenges in any 
capacity. This inconsistency strikes a chord fundamental to the fairness of 
our justice system, especially in light of the Supreme Court’s failure to 
eliminate the discriminatory exercise of the peremptory challenge in Batson. 
This Comment argues that, at this time, the federal system and remaining 
states should not move toward equalizing the number of peremptory 
challenges afforded to the defense and prosecution because allocating a 
greater number of peremptory challenges to the defense best serves 
theoretical fairness in the justice system, including maintaining the 
community’s perception the justice system’s fairness. Additionally, 
 
* J.D., Northwestern Pritzker School of Law, 2021. Thank you to all who played a part in 
bringing this Comment to fruition. Professor Shari Diamond provided incredible guidance 
and thoughtful feedback in the early stages of this Comment. Members of the Journal of 
Criminal Law and Criminology were also instrumental in editing and finalizing this 
Comment, and I am particularly grateful for the work of Miranda Roberts, Emily Grant, 
Teresa Manring, Ann Bayly Buck and Katherine Hanley. 
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allocating a greater number of peremptory challenges to the defense serves 
actual fairness by reducing opportunities for prosecutors to use peremptory 
challenges in a discriminatory manner. Finally, this Comment takes the novel 
approach of considering how the “progressive prosecution” movement may 
justify movement toward equalization in the future, by shifting the 
community’s perception of fairness and by increasing actual fairness in the 
exercise of peremptory challenges. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The peremptory challenge, though not constitutionally guaranteed, has 
long been considered essential in ensuring that the accused is tried before an 
impartial jury, a right guaranteed to the accused under the Sixth 
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Amendment.1 At the same time, the history of peremptory challenges 
demonstrates their potential for abuse, as lawyers, and particularly 
prosecutors, have used peremptory challenges to strike jurors on the basis of 
race and sex.2 Despite general agreement in the legal community regarding 
the importance of peremptory challenges and the need for oversight in how 
the prosecution and defense use them, the federal system and the states do 
not reach consensus on whether the defense should be afforded a greater 
number of peremptory challenges than the prosecution, or whether the two 
sides should have an equal number. 
Instead, the relative allocation of peremptory challenges to the defense 
and prosecution is at once in a state of paralysis and flux. Since the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure were promulgated in 1946, the federal system 
has maintained an unequal allocation of peremptory challenges that affords 
a greater number of peremptory challenges to the defense than the 
prosecution in noncapital cases, despite repeated legislative attempts to 
equalize the number of peremptory challenges.3 However, legislative 
proposals at the state level to equalize the number of peremptory challenges 
for each side have been successful. Currently, only nine states maintain an 
 
 1  See Proposed Amendments to The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 54 
(1977) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Richard L. Thornburg, Acting Deputy Att’y Gen.) 
(“Although nothing in the Constitution requires the Congress or the State to permit any 
peremptory challenges, nonetheless, the challenge, by virtue of its roots in English common 
law and its persistent use in this country dating from colonial to modern times in both the 
Federal and State criminal justice systems, has become established as a vital and necessary 
part of trial by jury.”); U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein 
the crime shall have been committed . . . .”); C.J. Williams, On the Origins of Numbers: Where 
Did the Number of Peremptory Strikes Come from and Why Is Origin Important?, 39 AM. J. 
TRIAL ADVOC. 481, 483 (2016). 
 2  See Williams, supra note 1, at 483 (“Peremptory strikes are viewed as problematic and 
fraught with potential for abuse, but at the same time recognized as critical to seating fair and 
impartial juries.”). 
 3  FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b). The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure currently allocate a 
greater number of peremptory challenges to the defense than the prosecution in noncapital 
felonies and an equal number of peremptory challenges to both sides in capital cases. Id. The 
most significant proposal to amend the Federal Rules to allocate an equal number of 
peremptory challenges to the prosecution and defense in noncapital cases occurred in 1977, 
but was rejected by the Judiciary Committee after three days of oral testimony by members of 
the legal community. See Hearing, supra note 1. This Comment does not focus on the 
distinction between capital and noncapital cases but rather focuses on the general resistance 
at the federal level to equalization in contrast to the trend among states toward equalization. 
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unequal allocation of peremptory challenges to some degree,4 and only five 
states afford a greater number of peremptory challenges to the defense than 
the prosecution in noncapital offenses.5 This is a substantially different 
picture than in the mid-twentieth century, when twenty states allocated a 
greater number of peremptory challenges to the defense for at least some 
offenses. 6 The stark contrast between the federal system’s resistance to 
 
 4  States adopt varying practices with respect to the peremptory challenge; some states 
afford a greater number of peremptory challenges for certain categories of felonies, but not 
others. See, e.g., N.J. R. GEN. APP. R. 1:8-3(d) (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:21-1 (West 2020)) 
(allocating twelve peremptory challenges to the State and twenty peremptory challenges to the 
defense “upon indictment for kidnapping, murder, aggravated manslaughter, manslaughter, 
aggravated assault, aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual 
contact, aggravated arson, arson, burglary, robbery, forgery if it constitutes a crime of the third 
degree as defined by N.J.SA § 2C:21-1b, or perjury,” and allocating both the State and the 
defense ten peremptory challenges “in other criminal actions”). 
 5  ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-33-305 (West 2020) (allocating ten peremptory challenges to the 
State and twelve peremptory challenges to the defense in prosecutions for capital murder and 
allocating six peremptory challenges to the State and eight to the defense in prosecutions for 
all other felonies); DEL. R. CRIM. P. SUPER. CT. 24 (allocating twelve peremptory challenges 
to the State and twenty peremptory challenges to the defense in capital cases, and allocating 
six peremptory challenges to both the State and defense in noncapital cases); MD. CODE ANN. 
CRIM. LAW § 4-313 (West 2020) (allocating the defense twelve and the State ten peremptory 
challenges in capital cases, the defense ten and the prosecution five in felonies carrying a 
sentence of at least twenty years, and four to each side in “other noncapital felonies”); MINN. 
R. CRIM. P. 26.02(6) (2020) (allocating nine peremptory challenges to the State and fifteen 
peremptory challenges to the defense in cases punishable by life imprisonment, and allocating 
three peremptory challenges to the state and five to the defense for any other offense); N.H. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 606:3 (2020) (allocating twenty peremptory challenges to the defense in 
capital murder trials, fifteen in first degree murder trials, and three in any other case; and 
allocating ten challenges to the State in capital murder trials, fifteen in first degree murder 
trials, and three in any other case); N.J. R. GEN. APP. R. 1:8-3(d) (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 2C:21-1 (West 2020)) (allocating twelve peremptory challenges to the State and twenty 
peremptory challenges to the defense “upon indictment for kidnapping, murder, aggravated 
manslaughter, manslaughter, aggravated assault, aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, 
aggravated criminal sexual contact, aggravated arson, arson, burglary, robbery, forgery if it 
constitutes a crime of the third degree as defined by N.J.S.A. § 2C:21-1b, or perjury,” and 
allocating both the State and the defense ten peremptory challenges “in other criminal 
actions”); N.M. R. CRIM. P. DIST. CT. 5-606 (allocating sixteen peremptory challenges to the 
State and twenty-four to the defense if the offense charged is punishable by death, eight 
peremptory challenges to the State and twelve to the defense if the offense charged is 
punishable by life imprisonment, and three peremptory challenges to the State and five to the 
defense in all other cases); S.C. CODE. ANN. § 14-9-200 (2020) (allocating three peremptory 
challenges to the State and five to the defense in all felony cases); W. VA. R. CRIM. P. 24(b)(1) 
(allocating two peremptory challenges to the State and six to the defense in offenses 
punishable by imprisonment for more than one year). 
 6  Anna Roberts, Asymmetry as Fairness: Reversing a Peremptory Trend, 92 WASH. U. 
L. REV. 1503, 1536 n.223 (2015). Until the 1970s, twenty states maintained an unequal 
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equalizing the number of peremptory challenges for noncapital cases and the 
states’ widespread adoption of equalization is surprising, if not troubling. The 
peremptory challenge is an important component of jury selection.7 After 
jurors have been questioned and both the prosecution and defense have made 
challenges for cause, both sides may use their respective peremptory 
challenges to strike prospective jurors without providing a reason for the 
strike.8 Accordingly, peremptory challenges serve as a kind of safety net at 
the end of jury selection, whereby parties can eliminate jurors they suspect 
might be biased or partial to the other side but who do not qualify for a 
challenge for cause.9 
However, many in the legal community consider peremptory challenges 
to be “fraught with potential for abuse” due to the subjective and potentially 
discriminatory nature of eliminating jurors without being required to provide 
an explanation.10 In 1986, the Supreme Court addressed this concern in 
Batson v. Kentucky.11 The Batson decision prohibited prosecutors from using 
peremptory challenges to strike potential jurors solely based on race, 
requiring them to give a neutral reason for any strike.12 The Batson 
prohibition was later extended to the defense’s use of peremptory challenges 
and to discriminatory use of the peremptory challenge to strike jurors on the 
basis of sex.13 Despite Batson, however, abuse of the peremptory challenge 
 
allocation of peremptory challenges in some form. These states included Alabama, Alaska, 
Arkansas, Delaware, Georgia, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, 
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, South Carolina, 
Tennessee, and West Virginia. Id.; see also id. at 1537 n.225 (“Since the 1970s, asymmetry 
has been abandoned in Alabama, Alaska, Georgia, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Missouri, 
Nebraska, North Carolina, Oregon, and Tennessee.”). 
 7  Brent J. Gurney, The Case for Abolishing Peremptory Challenges in Criminal Trials, 
21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 227, 230 (1986). 
 8  Id. at 228. 
 9  Id. at 227, 230; see also Roberts, supra note 6, at 1512 n.67. 
 10  Williams, supra note 1, at 483. 
 11  476 U.S. 79, 79–80 (1986). 
 12  Id. at 93–98. The Court established a three-step test to determine whether the 
prosecution exercised a peremptory challenge for a discriminatory reason. Id. Batson’s first 
step “requires the objecting party to establish a ‘prima facie case of purposeful discrimination.’ 
Step two shifts the burden to the party attempting to exercise the peremptory to give neutral 
reasons that are ‘related to the particular case to be tried’”; step three “requires the trial judge 
to decide whether the reasons are pretextual.” Nancy S. Marder, Justice Stevens, the 
Peremptory Challenge, and the Jury, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1683, 1697 (2006) (citation 
omitted). 
 13  See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992) (extending Batson’s prohibition to 
apply to defendants’ discriminatory use of the peremptory challenge); J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 
U.S. 127, 146 (1994) (extending Batson’s prohibition on discriminatory use of peremptory 
challenges to challenges based on gender). 
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is not an ancient relic, and the Batson test is generally considered to be 
insufficient to rein in discriminatory use of the peremptory challenge, 
particularly by the prosecution.14 A recent and poignant example of 
prosecutorial abuse of the peremptory challenge is the 2019 Supreme Court 
case, Flowers v. Mississippi, where the Court found extraordinary evidence 
of discriminatory intent by the prosecution in its use of peremptory 
challenges.15 For these reasons, legislators, judges, and the academic 
community have long considered how peremptory challenge procedures may 
safeguard and balance the interests of defendants, victims, and the 
community, and better promote the fair administration of justice. Some have 
even called for the abolition of the peremptory challenge altogether.16 
Given the importance of the peremptory challenge as well as its 
potential for abuse, the legal community should take note of states’ 
substantial departure from the federal system and consider which approach 
better serves fairness in our criminal justice system. One might be skeptical 
about the importance of the relative allocation of peremptory challenges at 
either the federal or state level, as the difference might involve only a handful 
of peremptory challenges that may or may not have a noticeable impact on 
the outcome of a trial. But this is a naïve view. Even one peremptory 
 
 14  See, e.g., Caren Myers Morrison, Negotiating Peremptory Challenges, 104 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 1, 1 (2014) (“[T]he Batson regime has proved spectacularly unsuccessful. It 
has not ended racial discrimination in jury selection . . . .”); Jere W. Morehead, When a 
Peremptory Challenge is No Longer Peremptory: Batson’s Unfortunate Failure to Eradicate 
Invidious Discrimination from Jury Selection, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 625, 633 (1994) (“Despite 
the Batson rule’s noble purpose, it cannot prevent clever lawyers from using peremptory 
challenges to strike potential jurors based upon impermissible rationales so long as they 
pretend to use other, permissible bases.”); Scott W. Howe, Deselecting Biased Juries, 2015 
UTAH L. REV. 289, 293 (2015) (“[The] Batson doctrine does not adequately regulate 
[peremptory challenges].”). 
 15  See Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2245 (2019). Flowers is the most recent 
Supreme Court decision to consider Batson violations. The case is exceptional for several 
reasons, including that Flowers was tried for the same series of murders six times. In Flowers, 
Flowers appealed his sixth trial conviction, claiming that the lead prosecutor, Doug Evans, 
had used his peremptory challenges in a discriminatory manner to strike five black prospective 
jurors. Id. In November 2019, the NAACP and other organizations filed a class-action suit 
against Evans, alleging that he and other prosecutors in his office had struck black jurors 4.4 
times more frequently than white jurors. Mihir Zaveri, White Prosecutor, Doug Evans, Asks 
to Recuse Himself from Curtis Flowers Case, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/07/us/doug-evans-curtis-flowers.html [https://perma.cc/Z
Q2U-PRBW]. Evans later asked to recuse himself from Flowers’s ongoing case. Id. 
 16  See, e.g., Batson, 476 U.S. at 102–03 (Marshall, J., concurring) (“The decision today 
will not end the racial discrimination that peremptories inject into the jury-selection process. 
That goal can be accomplished only by eliminating peremptory challenges entirely.”); 
Raymond J. Broderick, Why the Peremptory Challenge Should Be Abolished, 65 TEMP. L. 
REV. 369, 370–71 (1992); Marder, supra note 12, at 1714. 
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challenge provides potential for abuse on the basis of race or sex and may be 
“critical to seating fair and impartial juries.”17 And the defendant’s and 
community’s perception of the justice system may depend on the relative 
allocation of peremptory challenges. Accordingly, the legal community 
should monitor changes and trends in this area closely and consider whether 
an unequal or equal number of peremptory challenges for the prosecution and 
defense best serves the justice system.18 
Arguments for and against equalizing at the federal and state level have 
in large part centered on theoretical and practical notions of “fairness.”19 For 
the purposes of this Comment, theoretical fairness encompasses arguments 
focused on the relative “rights” and “interests” of the defendants, victims of 
crime, and the community in an impartial jury, as well as how the community 
perceives the justice system.20 Practical, or “actual” fairness encompasses 
arguments considering empirical data on the parties’ abuse of peremptory 
challenges in jury selection. This Comment argues that the states’ trend 
toward equalization of the number of peremptory challenges allocated to the 
prosecution and defense is unwise because an unequal allocation best serves 
both notions of fairness, considering the arguments highlighted in the debates 
over the relative allocation of peremptory challenges throughout its history 
and the practical use of the peremptory challenge today. If, however, an equal 
number of peremptory challenges for each side is a worthy goal—a question 
explored further infra—this Comment argues that the progressive 
prosecution movement may justify equalizing the number of peremptory 
challenges between the prosecution and defense in the future. 
 
 17  Williams, supra note 1, at 483. 
 18  Id. at 510–11 (“Whether each side receives the same number of peremptory strikes is 
a vital issue. Most state legislatures afford each side the same number of peremptory strikes 
in criminal cases, while the federal rules grant defendants more peremptory strikes in felony 
cases, but not in capital or misdemeanor cases.”). 
 19  See Roberts, supra note 6, at 1538–41; see also Note, Judging the Prosecution, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 2121, 2131 (2006) (discussing peremptory challenges in the context of “two 
related considerations: the extent to which [criminal] process is perceived as being fair and 
just, and the extent to which [criminal] process is actually fair and just”). Though the author 
discusses abolition of the peremptory challenge, this framework is helpful for categorizing 
arguments regarding the proper allocation of peremptory challenges between the prosecution 
and defense as well. 
 20  Theoretical fairness includes, for example, arguments made by proponents of the 
Victim Rights Bill of 1995, which sought to equalize the number of peremptory challenges 
for noncapital federal felony offenses in order to protect victims’ rights relative to the 
defendant. See, e.g., Victim Rights and Domestic Violence Prevention Act of 1995, S. 1483, 
104th Cong. (1st Sess. 1995); see also 141 CONG. REC. 38275–77 (1995) (statement of Sen. 
Kyl). 
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The notion that the states should maintain an unequal allocation of 
peremptory challenges is not new in legal scholarship.21 However, this 
Comment explores anew the bases for various allocations, which have shifted 
over time. Further, it takes a novel approach in considering how the 
progressive prosecution movement may shape the proper allocation of 
peremptory challenges and perhaps even justify the current shift toward equal 
allocation of peremptory challenges. Part I discusses the origins of the 
peremptory challenge and justifications for equal and unequal allocation of 
peremptory challenges. It considers the English roots of the peremptory 
challenge, the adoption of the peremptory challenge in the United States, the 
legislative history surrounding Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure—which governs the allocation of peremptory challenges—and 
state legislative history. Part II discusses the justifications for the right of 
both the prosecution and the defense to the peremptory challenge, 
considering arguments from legislative history and relevant case law, 
including Batson and its progeny. Part III discusses whether the trend toward 
equalization is wise, considering the justifications provided in Parts I and II. 
Finally, Part IV examines how progressive prosecution may change the 
current landscape of fairness in the peremptory challenge context to warrant 
an equal number of peremptory challenges for both sides. 
I. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR FEDERAL AND STATE ALLOCATIONS OF THE 
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE 
Peremptory challenges are limited in number, set in the federal system 
by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and in the states by statute.22 
 
 21  Scholars who have considered the proper relative allocation of peremptory challenges 
include Anna Roberts, Katherine Goldwasser, Richard Friedman, and C.J. Williams. For their 
perspectives, see, respectively, Roberts, supra note 6, at 1538–39 (“[A]symmetry [in the 
allocation of peremptory challenges] does not equate to unfairness and, indeed, has been a 
foundational component of efforts to create a fair criminal justice system . . . . [A]n 
asymmetrical allocation of peremptory challenges offers particular opportunities with respect 
to the difficulties of the Batson doctrine.”); Katherine Goldwasser, Limiting a Criminal 
Defendant’s Use of Peremptory Challenges: On Symmetry and the Jury in a Criminal Trial, 
102 HARV. L. REV. 808, 808 (1989) (considering whether Batson-like restrictions should apply 
symmetrically to the defense as it does to the prosecution); Richard D. Friedman, An 
Asymmetrical Approach to the Problem of Peremptories?, 28 CRIM. L. BULL. 507, 507 (1992) 
(considering the relative importance of peremptory challenges to the defense and prosecution 
and considering asymmetry in the allocation of peremptory challenges to both sides); 
Williams, supra note 1, at 481 (reviewing the bases for various allocations of peremptory 
challenges in the United States over time and arguing that the proper allocation must be 
determined through empirical study). 
 22  Coburn R. Beck, The Current State of the Peremptory Challenge, 39 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 961, 964 n.27 (1998). 
2021] PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES 281 
Currently, the allocation of peremptory challenges varies between the federal 
government and among the states. In the federal system, Rule 24(b) of the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure dictates the number of peremptory 
challenges allocated to the defense and prosecution in criminal cases.23 The 
numbers vary by severity of the offense.24 In capital cases, the defense and 
prosecution are each allocated twenty peremptory challenges.25 In noncapital 
felony cases, the defense is allocated ten peremptory challenges and the 
prosecution is allocated six.26 By contrast, most states allocate an equal 
number of peremptory challenges to the defense and prosecution in both 
capital cases and noncapital cases, with the absolute number of peremptory 
challenges increasing with the severity of the offense.27 
Some states, however, allocate an unequal number of peremptory 
challenges to the prosecution and defense, granting a greater number of 
peremptory challenges to the defense than the prosecution. Even among these 
states, the peremptory challenge allocation varies. Minnesota, for example, 
grants a greater number of peremptory challenges to the defense than the 
prosecution in cases involving life sentences and noncapital felonies,28 while 
Delaware grants a greater number of peremptory challenges to the defense 
than the prosecution in capital cases, but an equal number of peremptory 
challenges to both parties in noncapital felonies.29 Maryland, on the other 
hand, maintains a sort of hybrid system of allocation: the state allocates a 
greater number of peremptory challenges to the defense for capital felonies 
and for noncapital felonies that carry a sentence of twenty years or more, but 
it allocates an equal number of peremptory challenges to the state and defense 
in other noncapital felonies.30 
This Part traces the historical development of the peremptory challenge 
and highlights justifications for the relative allocation of peremptory 
challenges between the prosecution and the defense in the federal system and 
among the states. The origins of the peremptory challenge demonstrate an 
early concern with the relative allocation of peremptory challenges between 
the prosecution and defense. Further, legislative history surrounding 
proposed amendments to the Federal Rules and to state legislation 
demonstrates that proponents and opponents of equalization have primarily 
 
 23  FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b). 
 24  Id. 
 25  Id. 
 26  Id. This Comment does not examine peremptory challenges in misdemeanor cases. 
 27  Roberts, supra note 6, at 1535; see also supra note 5. 
 28  MINN. R. CRIM. PROC. 26.02(6) (2020). 
 29  DEL. R. CRIM P. SUPER. CT. 24(b). 
 30  MD. CODE. ANN. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 8-420 (West 2020). 
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focused on the notion of “fairness” in considering the proper allocation of 
peremptory challenges between the prosecution and the defense. 
A. HISTORY OF THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE ALLOCATION: FROM 
ENGLAND TO THE UNITED STATES 
Since the fourteenth century, jurists have viewed the peremptory 
challenge’s role in trial procedure with profound respect.31 Additionally, 
lawmakers historically appeared more concerned with the relative allocation 
of peremptory challenges—and the relative importance of the peremptory 
challenge as to the defense and the prosecution—than the absolute number 
of peremptory challenges.32 In England, peremptory challenges can be traced 
back to medieval times.33 Initially, the Crown had an unlimited number of 
peremptory challenges, which served as a symbol of the absolute power or 
“infallib[ility]” of the monarchy.34 In 1305, however, Parliament eliminated 
the Crown’s peremptory challenge in a step toward democratization, noting 
that a jury “selected by the Crown was ‘obnoxious to justice.’”35 
Although the Crown’s right to the peremptory challenge was technically 
eliminated, the Crown soon began to exercise its power to “stand aside” 
jurors. This practice allowed the Crown to strike jurors in much the same way 
the peremptory challenge did.36 The stand aside involved a prosecutor 
initially assigning a potential juror a challenge for cause without 
explanation.37 The court then instructed that juror to stand aside until all 
 
 31  See Morrison, supra note 14, at 10; Marder, supra note 12, at 1692 (“There are both 
powerful historical and practical reasons for preserving the peremptory challenge. Justice 
Stevens has [a] deep respect for history . . . [which] might lead him to maintain the peremptory 
[challenge] . . . .”). 
 32  See Judith Heinz, Peremptory Challenges in Criminal Cases: A Comparison of 
Regulation in the United States, England, and Canada, 16 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 
201, 207–08 (1993). Early changes in the allocation of peremptory challenges involved 
shifting or overhauling the allocation of peremptory challenges to increase or decrease the 
power of the government as to the defense, as well as promoting “the appearance of fairness 
to the accused.” Id. at 208–211; see also Williams, supra note 1, at 505–07 (suggesting that 
while the absolute number of peremptory challenges, historically, seems to lack logic or 
coherence, legislators’ concern with the relative number of peremptory challenges is reflected 
in legislative history). 
 33  Heinz, supra note 32, at 207. 
 34  Alexa B. Moeller, Has the “Last Petal” Fallen?: Beauty of the Modern Jury Trial and 
the Beast Known as the Peremptory Challenge, 63 S.D. L. REV. 193, 196 (2018) (citation 
omitted). 
 35  Heinz, supra note 32, at 208. 
 36  Id. at 209. 
 37  Id. 
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venire members had been examined by the defense and prosecution.38 Only 
once the “stood aside” juror was called again would the prosecutor have to 
prove the challenge for cause.39 Simply put, the government could have 
prospective jurors stand aside from jury selection and pass over that juror to 
the next before showing cause for removing them.40 The court only seated a 
stood aside juror thereafter if, after questioning remaining jurors, a jury could 
not be seated without him.41 
The lawmakers who created the stand aside in England did so with the 
perception that juries would be “too defense-oriented,” likely believing that 
jurists could “conduct[] trials fairly, even though the Crown controlled jury 
selection.”42 According to one scholar, the creation of the stand aside “marks 
the beginning of a conflict between confidence in the fairness of the 
prosecutor as an officer of the court versus a suspicion of placing too much 
power in the prosecutor as representative of the sovereign.”43 Nonetheless, 
the decision to allocate no peremptory challenges to the Crown and an 
unlimited number to the defense was symbolically significant, leading 
English jurists to consider the peremptory challenge a “defendant’s 
privilege.”44 After 1305, only defendants were permitted to exercise 
peremptory challenges.45 By 1530, parliament set a fixed number of 
peremptory challenges for the defense: defendants were allocated thirty-five 
peremptory challenges for cases involving high treason and twenty 
challenges in all other cases.46 
B. ADOPTION OF THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE IN THE UNITED 
STATES 
Peremptory challenge practices in the United States initially mirrored 
the English common law.47 At the time of the United States’ founding, 
defendants were given thirty-five peremptory challenges in cases of treason 
and twenty peremptory challenges in cases of murder or other felonies.48 The 
prosecution was able to stand aside jurors, but it was not able to exercise any 
 
 38  Id. 
 39  Williams, supra note 1, at 489. 
 40  Id. at 488–89. 
 41  Id. at 489. 
 42  Heinz, supra note 32, at 210. 
 43  Id. at 210–11. 
 44  Id. 
 45  Id. 
 46  Id. at 211. 
 47  See Williams, supra note 1, at 502. 
 48  See id. 
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peremptory challenges.49 Although the Framers considered adding a 
constitutional guarantee to the peremptory challenge, “they decided this right 
was implicit in a defendant’s right to an impartial jury.”50 Instead, the 
Constitution granted to the defendant only the right to trial by an impartial 
jury under the Sixth Amendment, leaving peremptory challenges to be 
established at common law or by Congress.51 
In 1790, Congress passed an act implementing the first peremptory 
challenge allocation.52 That act granted the defense thirty-five peremptory 
challenges in cases involving treason and twenty challenges in all other 
capital cases.53 Following the English tradition, Congress allocated no 
peremptory challenges to the prosecution.54 In 1865, however, Congress 
passed a second federal statute allocating “a small number of peremptory 
challenges to the prosecution” and a greater number to the defense.55 
Congress continued to modify the absolute number of peremptory 
challenges allocated to the defense and prosecution over time. In 1872, 
Congress allocated the defense twenty peremptory challenges and the 
prosecution five peremptory challenges in capital cases.56 For any other 
felony, the defendant was entitled to ten peremptory challenges and the 
government was entitled to three.57 However, “there is nothing in the 
legislative history” of the Act that implemented the change explaining why 
these particular numbers were chosen.58 Then, in 1911, Congress increased 
the number of peremptory challenges allocated to the prosecution to six in 
capital cases, maintaining twenty peremptory challenges for the defense.59 
Again, legislative history does not provide the reasoning behind this 
change.60 
 
 49  Id. 
 50  Moeller, supra note 34, at 197. 
 51  Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 585–86 (1919); see also Williams, supra note 
1, at 504 (citation omitted). 
 52  Williams, supra note 1, at 504. 
 53  Id. (citing 1 Stat. 119 § 30 (1790)). 
 54  Id. at 495. 
 55  Roberts, supra note 6, at 1534; see also Williams, supra note 1, at 504–05. Prior to the 
passage of the second statute, certain states had allowed the prosecution to exercise the “stand 
asides” employed by the Crown in England, but the practice received substantial criticism and 
was mostly given up with the 1865 statute. See id. at 491–94. 
 56  Williams, supra note 1, at 505. 
 57  Id. 
 58  Id. 
 59  Id. 
 60  Id. 
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Peremptory challenges in the state context followed a similar trajectory 
at first. After the country’s founding, states began to codify peremptory 
challenges in criminal trials.61 They typically allocated fewer peremptory 
strikes to the prosecution than to the defendant.62 Some states refused to 
allocate any peremptory challenges to the prosecution, allowing the 
prosecution to raise only for-cause challenges.63 Over time, however, state 
courts reduced the absolute number of peremptory challenges adopted from 
the English system.64 At the same time, state governments began to increase 
the number of peremptory challenges allocated to the prosecution and started 
to move toward an equalization of the number of peremptory challenges 
allocated to the prosecution and the defense.65 Scholar Anna Roberts notes 
that between 1854 and 1939, twenty-seven states moved from an unequal 
allocation of peremptory challenges to an equal number of peremptory 
challenges.66 
C. THE FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
In 1946, the first version of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
was promulgated, and the allocation of peremptory challenges set at that time 
has not changed. The Rules provide the defense and prosecution with an 
equal number of peremptory challenges in capital cases and the defense with 
a greater number of peremptory challenges than the prosecution in noncapital 
felony cases.67 Notably, the first draft, which was proposed in 1941, allocated 
an equal number of peremptory challenges to the prosecution and the 
defense.68 The second draft, proposed a year later, maintained an equal 
 
 61  Id. at 503. 
 62  April J. Anderson, Peremptory Challenges at the Turn of the Nineteenth Century: 
Development of Modern Jury Selection Strategies as Seen in Practitioners’ Trial Manuals, 16 
STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 1, 18–19 (2020) (“Although state procedures were hardly uniform, in 
general they reduced prosecutorial power in picking the jury, as compared either with common 
law procedures or with the challenges most states afforded defendants.”). 
 63  Id. at 19, 19 n.118. 
 64  Williams, supra note 1, at 502–03. 
 65  Id. 
 66  Roberts, supra note 6, at 1536 n.224. These states included Rhode Island, Colorado, 
Illinois, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Idaho, Iowa, Nevada, Florida, Vermont, Texas, 
Pennsylvania, Connecticut, South Dakota, Wisconsin, Virginia, Washington, Montana, 
California, North Dakota, Ohio, Louisiana, Arizona, Hawaii, Kansas, Wyoming, and New 
York. Id. 
 67  FED R. CRIM. P. 24(b); Roberts, supra note 6, at 1534. 
 68  During the drafting of the Rules jurists debated the allocation of peremptory challenges 
to the defense and prosecution, and the proposed equal allocation was ultimately rejected. 
Roberts, supra note 6, at 1534. In 1941, an advisory committee began drafting the Federal 
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number of peremptory challenges for each side—twenty challenges in 
treason and capital offenses and six challenges in noncapital felonies.69 The 
defense was jointly allocated ten peremptory challenges in noncapital felony 
cases if multiple defendants were to be tried.70 
The Advisory Committee received many proposals regarding the 
relative allocation of peremptory challenges throughout the drafting 
process.71 For example, in considering the Second Preliminary Draft in 1944, 
a representative for the Bar Committee for the Western District of Tennessee 
argued that a defendant should always be allocated a greater number of 
challenges than the government because “[t]he jury comes to know the 
government attorneys better than the attorney for the defendant, as the latter 
appears only in part of the cases,” and “the defendant’s attorney does not 
have the means to investigate the background of prospective jurors, and so 
must rely more on hunches than the government.”72 One United States 
Attorney argued that the government “could not object to the equalization of 
challenges,” but that the government had not felt disadvantaged in the past 
by the defendant’s greater number of challenges.73 Yet another individual 
argued that in cases of treason or capital offenses, the defendant should have 
twenty peremptory challenges and the government should have six 
peremptory challenges, but for all other offenses, the defense and 
government should both be allocated six peremptory challenges.74 
Ultimately, the Advisory Committee settled on the current rule in its Final 
Report of the Advisory Committee of June 1944.75 In capital cases the 
defense and prosecution would each be allocated twenty challenges.76 For 
noncapital offenses, the government would have six challenges, but the 
defendant or defendants together would have ten.77 “If there was more than 
 
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Lester B. Orfield, Trial Jurors in Federal Criminal Cases, 29 
F.R.D. 43, 44–45 (1962). The first draft of Rule 24—at the time, Rule 47—“was modeled 
quite closely on Rule 47 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . . .” Id. See First Preliminary 
Draft of Fed. R. Crim. P. 47 (1941). The draft of criminal Rule 47 provided that “[t]he number 
of peremptory challenges which will be permitted to the defendant . . . and the number which 
shall be permitted to the attorney for the government shall be the same.” Orfield, supra note 
68, at 44–45; see also Second Preliminary Draft of Fed. R. Crim. P. 47 (1942). 
 69  Orfield, supra note 68, at 45. 
 70  Id. 
 71  Id. at 44–45. 
 72  Id. at 52. 
 73  Id. at 48–49. 
 74  Id. at 53. 
 75  Id. 
 76  Id. at 43; see also FED. R. CRIM. P. advisory committee’s final report on Published 
Drafts of the Rules at p. 47 (1944). 
 77  Id. at 53. 
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one defendant the court might allow additional challenges.”78 “The Supreme 
Court adopted this draft without any change.”79 
Another major call for reform in the federal system came in 1977, when 
the House Judiciary Committee reviewed a bill to amend Rule 24.80 The bill 
sought to equalize and reduce the number of challenges afforded the 
prosecution and the defense.81 The debate regarding the change focused on 
“whether the proposed changes in [R]ule 24(b) are compatible with the 
[S]ixth [A]mendment right of the accused to an impartial jury” and would be 
wise, given practical use of the peremptory challenges by both parties.82 A 
substantial amount of testimony in opposition focused on the historical 
allocation of peremptory challenges, the greater interest of the defense than 
the prosecution in the outcome of a criminal case, and the practical advantage 
that would be afforded to the prosecution if the number of peremptory 
challenges were to be equalized.83 
Multiple constituents argued that a reduced number of peremptory 
challenges would not be sufficient to “enable the defendant to achieve a jury 
free of bias against the accused.”84 Jay Schulman of the National Jury Project 
cited the 1790 act of Congress allocating to the defense “a favorable ratio of 
four to one over the Government in capital cases” and the 1911 act allocating 
to the defense a favorable ratio of two to one in felony cases.85 Schulman also 
pointed to practical evidence that it was “the U.S. Attorney who is most likely 
to eliminate people from a particular group” whereas the defense was “more 
likely to take jurors from whence they come and to operate on whim or 
caprice.”86 He further pointed to research demonstrating that a substantial 
portion of the community believed an indictment was “tantamount to guilt,” 
citing surveys conducted by the National Jury Project.87 His testimony 
implied that the “advantages” to the defense of the presumption of innocence 
and the government’s higher burden of proof would not be enough to 
eliminate the risk that the community might view an indictment as indicative 
of guilt.88 Accordingly, those advantages to the defense would not be 
 
 78  Id. 
 79  Id. at 53–54. 
 80  See Hearing, supra note 1, at 1. 
 81  Id. at 57 (statement of Deputy Att’y Gen. Richard L. Thornburgh). 
 82  Id. at 3. 
 83  See id. at 3–5. 
 84  Id. at 3. 
 85  Id. at 4. 
 86  Id. at 9. 
 87  Id. at 3. 
 88  Id. at 3, 6. 
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sufficient to warrant allocating an equal number of peremptory challenges to 
the prosecution and defense. As another member of the American Bar 
Association argued more simply, “The defendant is the one that goes off to 
jail.”89 This sentiment was echoed by another testifier, who explained that 
while the right to the peremptory challenge is important to both the 
government and the defendant, it is more important to the defendant because 
the defendant is “personally involved in the result of the trial.”90 
On the other hand, supporters of the amendment argued that the 
prosecution has an equal right to an impartial jury. For example, the standing 
Attorney General argued that the government, as the representative of the 
public, “is entitled no less than the defendant to a fair trial;” for this reason, 
he argued it was “appropriate to permit both the Government and the 
defendant to exercise, at least initially as a matter of right, an equal number 
of peremptory challenges.”91 He stated, “[T]he inequality that exists . . . is 
not justifiable in terms of any apparent policy embodied in the rule itself.”92 
Ultimately, however, the amendment was rejected.93 The Judiciary 
Committee explained that it would be “unwise” to reduce the number of 
peremptory challenges allocated to each side because testimony 
demonstrated that prosecutors used peremptory challenges to systematically 
exclude classes of people more often than the defense.94 
In 1995, proponents of the Victim Rights and Domestic Violence 
Prevention Act unsuccessfully sought to amend the Federal Rules and 
equalize the number of peremptory challenges between the defense and 
prosecution for noncapital felony offenses.95 The goal of the bill was to 
“strengthen the rights of domestic violence victims in Federal court and 
hopefully set a standard for the individual states to emulate.”96 With respect 
to the peremptory challenge, proponents of the bill sought to “level [the] 
playing field” between the defendant and the victim.97 Proponents explained, 
“Violence in our society leaves law-abiding citizens feeling defenseless . . . . 
Federal law currently gives the defense more chances than the prosecution to 
reject a potential juror. [This] bill protects the right of victims to an impartial 
 
 89  Id. at 134. 
 90  Id. at 216. 
 91  Id. at 57. 
 92  Id. at 57–58. 
 93  Id. at 278. 
 94  Id. 
 95  Victim Rights and Domestic Violence Prevention Act of 1995, S. 1483, 104th Cong. 
(1st Sess. 1995); see also 141 CONG. REC. 38275–77 (1995) (statement of Sen. Kyl). 
 96  141 CONG. REC. 38275–77 (1995) (statement of Sen. Kyl). 
 97  141 CONG. REC. 12796–97 (1995) (statement of Sen. DeWine). 
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jury by giving both sides the same number of peremptory challenges.”98 A 
similar argument was made by another proponent of the Victim Rights Bill. 
The proponent stated, “[W]e should give victims an impartial trial, jury, and 
a fair shake. To do that, I think we need to give both the prosecution and the 
defense simply the same number of peremptory challenges. It only seems 
right, and it only seems fair.”99 
D. STATE ALLOCATIONS OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES 
States that amended their peremptory challenge rules to provide for 
equality between the prosecution and defense have also done so on the basis 
of victims’ rights, arguing that there is no justification for granting the 
defense an advantage in the selection of an impartial jury, and also on the 
logic of saving courts time and resources.100 As scholar Anna Roberts 
explains, “State legislators and members of the executive admit to ignorance 
about the historical picture and bafflement about the current need for [an 
unequal allocation of peremptory challenges].”101 In particular, states have 
proven more open to victims’ rights arguments, as advocates have 
successfully argued that victims’ rights warrant an equal allocation of 
peremptory challenges to the defense and prosecution, whereas victims’ 
rights justifications have failed at the federal level. For example, Oregon 
adopted equality of peremptory challenges pursuant to its Crime Victims’ 
Bill of Rights.102 The Bill relied on the notion that “victims of crime are 
entitled to fair and impartial treatment in our criminal justice system” to 
justify an equal allocation of peremptory challenges.103 Further, in Georgia, 
another state that adopted an equal allocation of peremptory challenges, a 
member of the legislature explained that a system that granted the defense a 
 
 98  141 CONG. REC. 38275–77 (1995) (statement of Sen. Kyl). 
 99  141 CONG. REC. 12796–97 (1995) (statement of Sen. DeWine). 
 100  See Roberts, supra note 6, at 1538 (“Efforts to equalize the allocation of peremptory 
challenges are explained on the basis that there is no apparent justification—other than 
attempting to give an unfair advantage to the defense—for maintaining asymmetry.”). Roberts 
also explains,  
On the issue of rights . . . the notion that constitutional rights are accorded to the 
defendant, and not to either the prosecution or the alleged victim, is frequently 
obscured. One does not have to look further than the discussions about moving toward 
symmetrical allocation of peremptory challenges to see examples of a notion that rights 
not only exist on both sides but also are equal on both sides. 
Id. at 1547. This argument is present in the victims’ rights supporters’ claims. Id. at 1547–48. 
 101  Id. at 1538 (citation omitted). 
 102  Id. at 1548. 
 103  Id. 
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greater number of peremptory challenges than the prosecution gave “more 
rights to the defendant than to the victim.”104 
Multiple states that maintain an unequal allocation of peremptory 
challenges have considered reforming the number and allocation of 
peremptory challenges as well. One example is the State of New Jersey. 
Currently, the state allocates the defense twenty peremptory challenges and 
the prosecution twelve peremptory challenges in cases where a defendant is 
charged with offenses carrying more serious penalties, such as murder, 
sexual assault, and arson.105 For “other criminal actions,” the defense and the 
state are each entitled to ten peremptory challenges.106 In 2000, New Jersey 
assembly members introduced Bill A727 for review by the legislature, which 
sought to equalize the number of peremptory challenges in the “serious 
crimes” listed above, and to reduce the absolute number of peremptory 
challenges allocated to both sides.107 The Bill proposed that the state and the 
defense would each receive eight peremptory challenges if the defendant was 
tried alone and six per defendant if defendants were tried jointly.108 The 
purpose proffered for the Bill was to “reduce the number of peremptory 
challenges afforded the prosecution and defense in order to reduce the 
disparity between the two sides and to decrease the delay in the progress of 
these criminal cases.”109 However, the Bill never progressed past the New 
Jersey Assembly’s Judiciary Committee. 110  
In 2005, the Special Supreme Court Committee on Peremptory 
Challenges and Jury Voir Dire produced a report to the Supreme Court of 
New Jersey recommending changes to peremptory challenges and voir 
dire.111 The Committee recommended eliminating the distinction between 
“serious” offenses and other offenses, and reducing the absolute number of 
peremptory challenges afforded to both parties.112 However, the Committee 
emphasized that there should continue to be a greater number of peremptory 
challenges allocated to the defense compared to the prosecution.113 The 
 
 104  Id. at 1547–48. 
 105  N.J. R. GEN. APP, R. 1:8-3(d); N.J. STAT. ANN. 2C:21-1 (West 2020). 
 106  Id. 
 107  S. A727, 209th Leg., 2000 Sess. (N.J. 2000). 
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 109  Id. 
 110  S. A727, 209th Leg., 2000 Sess. (N.J. 2000) (LEXIS) (on file with JCLC).  
 111  N.J. SPEC. COMM. ON PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES AND VOIR DIRE, REPORT OF THE 
SPECIAL SUPREME COURT COMMITTEE ON PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES AND JURY VOIR DIRE 
(2005), https://njcourts.gov/notices/reports/peremptory_voirdire.pdf [https://perma.cc/CAG2
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 113  Id. at 52–53. 
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Committee, echoing arguments against equalizing peremptory challenges at 
the federal level, explained that despite significant changes in the criminal 
justice system, “there remains some residual advantage to the State in a 
criminal trial.”114 Therefore, “in recognition that the right to trial is a right 
possessed by the criminal defendant,” the Committee concluded that the 
defense should have a greater number of peremptory challenges than the 
state.115 However, as noted above, the state today only maintains an unequal 
allocation of the number of peremptory challenges between the prosecution 
and defense for the more serious offenses listed above and not in “other 
criminal felony” cases, despite the fact that in its recommendation, the 
Committee suggested an unequal allocation of eight peremptory challenges 
to the defense and six peremptory challenges to the state in all criminal 
cases.116 Currently, the state allocates ten peremptory challenges to each side 
in “other criminal” felonies.117 
II. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE DEFENSE AND PROSECUTORIAL PEREMPTORY 
CHALLENGE 
In the United States, judges and scholars have defended the peremptory 
challenge as instrumental in seating an impartial jury, a right guaranteed by 
the U.S. Constitution, despite the fact that the peremptory challenge itself is 
not constitutionally granted to either the defense or the prosecution.118 
However, acknowledgement that the peremptory challenge may be used 
unfairly or discriminatorily is almost as old as the peremptory challenge 
itself, as evidenced by the 1305 decision in England to eliminate the Crown’s 
right to the peremptory challenge.119 Thus, consideration of whether 
peremptory challenges should be allocated to the prosecution at all is 
warranted. This Part will consider the various justifications for both the 
defense and prosecutorial right to the peremptory challenge, as well as 
Batson’s impact on these justifications. 
 
 114  Id. With respect to changes in the criminal justice system, the Committee referenced 
the “provision of counsel for indigent defendants,” shifting societal attitudes, and the 
“expansion of the jury pool.” 
 115  Id. at 53. 
 116  Id. at 50–52. 
 117  N.J. R GEN. APP, R. 1:8-3(d); N.J. STAT. ANN. 2C:21-1 (West 2020). 
 118  See supra Part I. 
 119  See Heinz, supra note 32, at 208. 
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A. THE DEFENSE AND PROSECUTORIAL PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE 
The Sixth Amendment guarantees to the accused the right to trial by an 
impartial jury.120 Although not itself constitutionally guaranteed, the 
peremptory challenge has long been viewed as a guarantor of this right, and 
therefore an important, if not indispensable, facet of trial procedure.121 
The notion that a defendant has a right to the peremptory challenge is 
more deeply ingrained in the psyche of American jurists than the 
prosecution’s right to the peremptory challenge; however, the right of both 
parties to use this tool is commonly accepted.122 As discussed, when the 
practice began in the United States, peremptory challenges were granted only 
to the defendant.123 Since then, most jurists have staunchly supported the 
defendant’s right to the peremptory challenge. For example, in its 1965 
decision Swain v. Alabama,124 the Supreme Court noted the peremptory 
challenge’s historic significance, describing it as “one of the most important 
of the rights secured to the accused.”125 Further, the dissent in Swain stated: 
“[H]ow necessary it is, that a prisoner (when put to defend his life) should 
have a good opinion of his jury, the want of which might totally disconcert 
him; the law wills not that he should be tried by any one man against whom 
he has conceived a prejudice . . . .”126 Jurists who opposed an equal number 
of peremptory challenges during debate surrounding the 1977 proposed 
amendment to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure invoked similar 
sentiments.127 
However, in other decisions, the Supreme Court has made clear that the 
state also maintains an important interest in this tool. In its 1887 Hayes v. 
Missouri decision, for example, the Supreme Court explained, “The public 
prosecutor may have the strongest reasons to distrust the character of a juror 
offered . . . and yet find it difficult to formulate and sustain a legal objection 
to him. In such cases, the peremptory challenge is a protection against his 
 
 120  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 121  Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70 (1887) (“Experience has shown that one of the 
most effective means to free the jury box from men unfit to be there is the exercise of the 
peremptory challenge.”); see also Goldwasser, supra note 18, at 827; Williams, supra note 1, 
at 483 (“Peremptory strikes are . . . recognized as critical to seating fair and impartial juries.”). 
 122  See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 21, at 513, 510 (noting that “[p]rosecutors’ 
peremptories stand on weaker ground than do the accused’s” and that “historical background 
suggests . . . [that] . . . [peremptories] exist principally for the benefit of criminal 
defendants”). 
 123  See supra Section I.B. 
 124  380 U.S. 202 (1965). 
 125  Id. at 219 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Marder, supra note 12, at 1692. 
 126  Swain, 380 U.S. at 242. 
 127  See, e.g., Hearing, supra note 1, at 3–4 (statement of Jay Schulman). 
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being accepted.”128 Additional decisions have highlighted the same point. For 
example, in Commonwealth v. Soares, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court noted: “While we have highlighted a defendant’s right to be protected 
from the improper use of peremptory challenges, we recognize the 
Commonwealth’s interest in prosecutions that are tried before the tribunal 
which the Constitution regards as most likely to produce a fair result.”129 That 
court held that the prosecution was “equally to be entitled to a representative 
jury, unimpaired by improper exercise of peremptory challenges by the 
defense.”130 States’ reform of the peremptory challenge based on the victims’ 
rights bills discussed above also support this view. 
B. BATSON, ITS PROGENY, AND ITS FAILURES 
The Supreme Court has recognized that abuse of the peremptory 
challenge, particularly by prosecutors, disserves defendants, the broader 
community, and the justice system as a whole. In Batson v. Kentucky, the 
Supreme Court held that prosecutors’ use of the peremptory challenge to 
exclude jurors on the basis of race violated the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.131 In that case, the Court lowered the incredibly 
high burden Swain v. Alabama placed on the defendant to prove that the 
prosecution had discriminatorily used its peremptory challenges.132 The 
Court in Batson articulated a three-part test—a defendant could make a prima 
facie showing of discrimination by demonstrating that: (1) he was a member 
of a distinct racial group; (2) the prosecutor used his peremptory challenges 
to remove venire members of the defendant’s race; and (3) the evidence 
raised an inference of discrimination by the prosecutor.133 Batson’s 
prohibition has been extended to prohibit discriminatory use of peremptory 
challenges by the defense and to prohibit discriminatory use of the 
peremptory challenges to strike jurors on the basis of gender.134 
Unfortunately, many scholars and jurists argue that Batson and its 
progeny do little in practice to prevent the discriminatory use of peremptory 
challenges, due to the high evidentiary burden placed on a party claiming a 
 
 128  120 U.S. 68, 70 (1887). 
 129  387 N.E.2d 499, 517 n.35 (Mass. 1979) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 130  Id.; see infra Part I.C. 
 131  476 U.S. 79, 84 (1986); see also Morehead, supra note 14, at 629. 
 132  Batson, 476 U.S. at 92–93. 
 133  See id. at 96. 
 134  See J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 146 (1994) (extending Batson’s prohibition on 
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges to challenges based on gender); Georgia v. 
McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992) (extending Batson’s prohibition to apply to defendants’ 
discriminatory use of the peremptory challenge). 
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Batson violation and the ease with which a party can concoct a race-neutral, 
nondiscriminatory reason for striking a potential juror.135 As one justice 
argued in his dissent in Commonwealth v. Hardcastle, the Batson prohibition 
on race-based peremptory challenges is “effectively nullified by evidentiary 
requirements that virtually insulate a prosecutor’s use of the peremptory 
challenge to exclude jurors.”136 Once a party brings a Batson challenge, the 
challenged party must “develop a record in voir dire to defend the peremptory 
challenges used against a claim of discrimination” while the challenging 
party must develop a “similar record to argue that the peremptory challenges 
were racially motivated.”137 Then, a Batson challenge requires a court to “sift 
through counsel’s words for patterns or pretexts of discrimination.”138 
Additionally, once a Batson challenge is made against a lawyer, the lawyer 
need only provide a neutral reason for striking the juror.139 This is an easy 
bar to meet, as “lawyers [can] offer absurd pretexts for their discriminatory 
use of peremptory challenges and, in doing so, evade Batson’s 
protections.”140 
Researchers considering North Carolina’s Batson record over the past 
three decades have echoed this concern.141 Tellingly, “in all the 114 North 
Carolina appellate Batson cases involving minority jurors decided on the 
merits since 1986, the courts have never found a substantive Batson violation 
where a prosecutor has managed to articulate even one reason, however 
fantastic, for the peremptory challenge.”142 The researchers also cited orders 
issued by North Carolina Judge Gregory Weeks in 2012 as further evidence 
demonstrating “the regularity with which North Carolina prosecutors offer 
pretextual reasons for [discriminatory] peremptory strikes,” which were 
often “thinly-disguised.”143 For example, prosecutors might provide neutral 
reasons for their challenges such as “lack of eye contact, air of defiance, arms 
folded, leaning away from questioner, and evasive.”144 Additionally, many 
appellate courts are deferential to trial courts in reviewing Batson challenges, 
 
 135  Morehead, supra note 14, at 633–34. 
 136  546 A.2d 1101, 1113 (Pa. 1988) (Nix, C.J., dissenting); id. at 634. 
 137  Id. at 636. 
 138  People v. Bolling, 591 N.E.2d 1136, 1142 (N.Y. 1992) (Bellacosa, J., concurring); 
see also Roberts, supra note 6, at 1511. 
 139  Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98 (1986). 
 140  Roberts, supra note 6, at 1512. 
 141  See Daniel R. Pollitt & Brittany P. Warren, Thirty Years of Disappointment: North 
Carolina’s Remarkable Appellate Batson Record, 94 N.C. L. REV. 1957, 1963 (2016). 
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 143  Id. at 1980. 
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meaning that failures of trial courts to “adequately [] police peremptory 
challenges” are often left undisturbed.145 
In light of Batson’s failures, scholars have suggested a number of 
approaches to prevent discriminatory abuse of the peremptory challenge. 
These include substantially limiting the absolute number of peremptory 
challenges, as well as the more drastic approaches of abolishing the 
peremptory challenge for the prosecution or abolishing the peremptory 
challenge entirely.146 Despite these proposals, the right of both parties to use 
peremptory challenges seems to be guaranteed, at least for now. One scholar 
cites the 2005 ABA Principles for Juries and Jury Trials as an example of 
“lawyers’ unwavering support for the peremptory challenge” for both 
parties.147 While the ABA’s proposal was “cutting-edge in many ways” with 
respect to jury procedure, it largely “preserve[d] the status quo” with respect 
to the peremptory challenge, dictating that the peremptory challenge should 
be available to both parties.148 
Further, in the 1990s a committee of jurists in Arizona, a “state at the 
vanguard of jury reform,” conducted a study of the jury system and voted to 
retain peremptory challenges for both parties.149 The committee reasoned that 
peremptory challenges are necessary “if jury selection [is] to be fair in fact 
and seen to be fair by the litigant, who would see that he or she had some 
degree of control over an otherwise random selection process.”150 
Additionally, in a study conducted in 1995 to assess federal district court 
judges’ views on the importance of peremptory challenges in criminal cases, 
judges overwhelmingly believed that on balance, peremptory challenges in 
their current state contribute positively to the justice system.151 Less than 
sixteen percent of district court judges supported eliminating the peremptory 
challenge entirely.152 Further, most of the judges who would retain the 
peremptory challenge “would also retain current rules and practices” in the 
 
 145  Roberts, supra note 6, at 1512. 
 146  See Williams, supra note 1, at 483–84; Broderick, supra note 16, at 369. 
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federal system.153 Interestingly, but perhaps not surprisingly, the judges were 
split along political lines with respect to their view on problems associated 
with peremptory challenges.154 When asked which of multiple factors was 
problematic in the context of peremptory challenges, “Republican appointees 
were more likely to view the unequal number of challenges allocated to each 
side as creating an unfair advantage for criminal defendants,” while 
Democratic appointees were more likely to consider peremptory challenges 
problematic because they are “a vehicle for producing discrimination in jury 
selection and composition.”155 
Overall, the consensus appears to be that the right of both parties to the 
peremptory challenge is so ingrained in the jury system that it will not be 
eliminated for either side in the near future. Thus, we must consider how the 
peremptory challenge system can be improved without completely 
eliminating the right and with a legal doctrine that is insufficient to root out 
discriminatory use of the peremptory challenge in practice. 
III. THE WISDOM OF EQUALITY: FROM THE THEORETICAL RIGHT TO THE 
PRACTICAL EXERCISE OF THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE 
The origins and legislative history of the peremptory challenge 
demonstrate that the legal community has considered the somewhat esoteric 
concept of “fairness” between the parties as central to the allocation of 
peremptory challenges to the prosecution. However, notwithstanding the 
theoretical “right” of each side to an impartial jury, arguments in legislative 
history also make clear that if the practical exercise of peremptory challenges 
results in a favorable advantage to one side, an equal allocation of peremptory 
challenges is not warranted. As highlighted in testimony given during the 
1977 effort to reform the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the defendant 
is the subject of the trial, and thus the consequences of a biased jury directly 
affect his freedom and potentially whether he lives or dies.156 To this end, 
defense counsel is charged with “zealously” advocating on behalf of her 
client.157 On the other hand, the prosecutor represents the interests of victims 
of crime and the community at large, and must, as a “minister of justice,” 
seek justice in the legal system.158 The view that victims have an interest 
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equal to that of defendants to a fair and impartial jury was highlighted in the 
1995 proposal to equalize the allocation of peremptory challenges as part of 
the Victim Rights and Domestic Violence Prevention Act, for example.159 
If viewed in a vacuum, only an equal allocation of peremptory 
challenges to the defense and prosecution would be “fair.” This notion, 
however, discounts the importance of how the defendant and community at 
large view the fairness of the justice system. Further, this view is premised 
on the assumption that the exercise of peremptory challenges is not shaped 
by factors that allow an inordinate opportunity for peremptory challenges to 
result in a jury partial to the government, thereby undermining the fairness 
of a technically equal system.160 This Part argues that allocating a greater 
number of peremptory challenges to the defense than to the prosecution better 
serves theoretical and actual fairness. 
A. THE THEORETICAL RIGHT TO THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE & 
PERCEPTIONS OF FAIRNESS 
The notion of fairness is at the heart of the argument to equalize the 
number of peremptory challenges, especially when argued on a victims’ 
rights basis. However, for a number of reasons, the defendant’s and 
community’s perception of the justice system’s fairness is best served by 
maintaining an unequal allocation of peremptory challenges, notwithstanding 
victims’ rights.161 
 
prosecutor is among the most important arbiters of justice’ due to her discretion in 
investigating and resolving criminal matters, thus elevating her to a ‘quasi-judicial’ role.” 
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(1985)). 
 159  141 CONG. REC. 38275–77 (1995) (statement of Sen. Kyl). 
 160  See Hearing, supra note 1, at 4 (statement of Jay Schulman). But see Williams, supra 
note 1, at 511–12 (“Ultimately, this is a policy question . . . . If Congress determines that 
criminal defendants need more peremptory strikes than the government to ensure a fair jury, 
then logically, criminal defendants should always be afforded more peremptory strikes than 
the government. In other words, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure should be changed 
to provide the defendant more peremptory strikes in all types of cases: capital, felony, and 
misdemeanor. If, on the other hand, the legislatures conclude the government has an interest 
equal to a criminal defendant in seating a fair jury, then the number of peremptory strikes 
afforded each side should always be equal. It is difficult to rationally justify the inconsistent 
distribution of peremptory strikes currently in place under the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure.”). This Comment disagrees with this view by considering more holistically the 
values served by an unequal or equal allocation of peremptory challenges. 
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defendant’s perception of fairness in the justice system with respect to peremptory challenges 
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First, it is important that the defendant view the process by which he is 
tried as just. As one scholar explains, “[g]iven the nature of a criminal trial, 
in which the state attempts to deprive an individual of liberty (or even of life), 
increasing not only the actuality of fairness but also the accused’s perception 
of fairness is a crucial goal.”162 While victims’ perception of justice is 
important, the broader community’s perception of justice is also better served 
by an unequal number of peremptory challenges, given the reality that 
prosecutors may be better able to use their peremptory challenges to strike a 
class of people from the jury and other imbalances in the criminal justice 
system. Notably, some argue that improper use of peremptory challenges by 
the prosecution, such as striking jurors on the basis of their race, harms the 
community’s perception of justice by delegitimizing the justice system.163 In 
this view, minority constituents are symbolically harmed when minorities are 
discriminatorily struck in open court, and the court environment gives the 
appearance of the American government’s seal of approval on such 
behavior.164 Further, there is evidence that members of the public in fact 
expect that prosecutors further justice and are concerned with the means by 
which prosecutors secure convictions.165 This community concern was 
recently reflected in the public outcry in response to Flowers v. 
Mississippi.166 In November 2019, the NAACP filed a class action lawsuit 
 
and implies that this goal may be even stronger than actual fairness. He goes so far as to argue 
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against the prosecutor in that case for his discriminatory use of peremptory 
challenges “on behalf of every potential Black juror in the district.”167 
Additionally, the notion of fairness does not depend on equality of rights 
between the prosecution and defense in other areas of the criminal justice 
system. Indeed, inequalities in these other areas of the system actually 
strengthen the community’s perception of the system’s fairness.168 Most 
fundamentally, this inequality is represented in the presumption of innocence 
of the accused that the prosecution must overcome beyond a reasonable 
doubt.169 Additionally, due process requires that the prosecution disclose 
certain evidence to the defense, while the defense has no corresponding 
duty.170 
Furthermore, strong procedural safeguards for the accused provide 
broad assurance that he or she will not be improperly convicted, serving the 
community’s perception of fairness in the criminal justice system. In 2005, 
the New Jersey state committee promulgating recommendations on the 
proper allocation of peremptory challenges explained in its memorandum 
that the state “represents ‘the people,’ including, in a broad sense, the 
jurors.”171 However, because the right to a trial by jury “is a right possessed 
by the defendant, the Committee determined that defendants should receive 
more peremptory challenges than the State.”172 Further, the Committee 
explained that a limitation in the absolute number of peremptory challenges 
along with an unequal allocation of peremptories between the defense and 
prosecution would not “adversely affect the interests of fairness and 
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justice.”173 In fact, the Committee expected that this arrangement would 
“enhance in the eyes of the public the credibility of our system of 
administering justice.”174 
B. PRACTICAL EXERCISE OF THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE AND 
ACTUAL FAIRNESS 
Actual fairness concerns whether the defense and prosecution actually 
use their peremptory challenges in a nondiscriminatory manner.175 Certain 
studies that have considered both the prosecutorial and defense use of 
peremptory challenges shed light on whether an equal or unequal allocation 
of peremptory challenges is more likely to produce impartial juries. In one 
such study, David Baldus and his colleagues examined the use of peremptory 
challenges in capital cases in Pennsylvania to determine the extent of 
discrimination in their use.176 The study found that: (1) discrimination on the 
basis of race and sex by prosecutors and defense attorneys is widespread; (2) 
nonetheless, prosecutors are “considerably more successful than defense 
counsel in their attempts to control jury composition”; and (3) the 
prosecution’s “‘advantage’ in the use of peremptory challenges” increases 
the probability of death sentences for defendants, increases “discrimination 
in the application of the death penalty,” and “denies defendants a trial by a 
jury that includes at least one of their ‘peers.’”177 Further, Baldus’s study 
found that the prosecution “disproportionately strik[es] black venire 
members and defense counsel disproportionately strik[es] non-blacks.”178 
The study also indicated that “most of the adverse impact of the current 
system on jury decision making flows from the aggressive use of 
peremptories by prosecutors against blacks and defense counsel against non-
blacks.”179 
Importantly, one theory Baldus considered was the “canceling out” 
theory of prosecutorial and defense peremptory challenges, which 
hypothesizes that each side’s peremptory challenges tend to offset the effects 
of the other side’s.180 The study suggested that this theory was relatively valid 
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if “viewed in the aggregate.”181 In other words, across all cases, the efforts of 
the two sides could reasonably be described as canceling each other out, and 
the defense may even have the upper hand.182 This is because “defense 
counsel use[d] a larger proportion of their peremptories” than did the 
prosecution, resulting in a higher strike rate for the defense.183 However, the 
study demonstrated a key prosecutorial advantage.184 Because the prime 
targets of the prosecution were “substantially smaller in number than were 
defense counsel’s prime targets,” the prosecution was more effective in 
depleting members of the target group.185 The study found, for example,  
that when two “prime [prosecution] targets, young black men and women, 
were present in a venire, they were completely eliminated 78% and 67% of 
the time, respectively . . . .”186 
The authors also touched on the practical incentive structure that shapes 
the prosecution’s discriminatory use of its peremptory challenges, namely, 
the importance of obtaining convictions.187 Specifically, they discussed 
Philadelphia, where for years prosecutors abided by a jury selection model 
set forth in a 1986 training video, the McMahon Tape.188 The video, which 
focused on how prosecutors could obtain more criminal convictions, 
provided instructions on how to select a “conviction prone” jury.189 The tape 
explained that “the worst jurors . . . are ‘blacks from the low-income areas’” 
because they have a “resentment for law enforcement [and] . . . for 
authority.”190 Similarly, in connection with a survey he was conducting on 
North Carolina’s Batson cases, a North Carolina trial judge “found that in the 
1990s North Carolina prosecutors circulated and used a ‘cheat sheet’ of 
approved reasons for minority strikes that included such reasons as ‘lack of 
eye contact,’ [and] ‘air of defiance’ . . . .”191 Prosecutors continue to use 
similarly illegitimate reasons to strike jurors today, and a convict at costs 
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culture persists in many offices around the country.192 Thus, not only are 
prosecutors more successful in eliminating their target groups, but the 
pressure to secure convictions can also encourage prosecutors to utilize 
peremptory challenges in a discriminatory manner, degrading both perceived 
and actual fairness. 
To conclude, in Batson v. Kentucky, Justice Marshall argued that only 
complete abolition of the peremptory challenge would prevent prosecutors’ 
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges.193 He explained that abolition 
of the peremptory challenge for both the prosecution and the defense would 
be fair because it would apply to both the prosecution and defense equally, 
much like the argument that equalization would be fair because it would 
apply equally to the prosecution and to the defense.194 However, the history 
of the peremptory challenge and debates that have followed calls for reform 
demonstrate that abolition will likely continue to be opposed and may be 
impossible to implement in the near future.195 Further, it is questionable 
whether abolition of the peremptory challenge would even lead to fairer 
results.196 At the very least, an unequal allocation of peremptory challenges 
is necessary to serve the goal of fairness. Inequality in the peremptory 
challenge context promotes both the accused’s and the community’s 
perceptions of fairness and mitigates the prosecution’s practical incentive to 
secure convictions by eliminating its target groups from the jury. 
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IV. LOOKING FORWARD: THE POTENTIAL PROMISE OF PROGRESSIVE 
PROSECUTION 
This Comment has, until this point, primarily considered arguments that 
have already been offered by commentators regarding whether the relative 
allocation of peremptory challenges between the prosecution and defense 
should be equal or unequal. One influence on the justice system that may 
limit the need for an unequal allocation of peremptory challenges is 
“progressive prosecution.” This Part describes the emergence of the 
progressive prosecution movement and considers whether the movement can 
serve perceived and actual fairness, making an unequal allocation of 
peremptory challenges unnecessary. It posits that if equality in the number of 
peremptory challenges is a worthy goal—to provide victims of sexual 
violence with a sense of recognition of their rights and experiences, for 
example—then the progressive prosecution movement may provide a 
solution by increasing the broader community’s perception of fairness and 
by providing a check on the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges in 
practice. 
A. BACKGROUND ON PROGRESSIVE PROSECUTION 
Prosecutors, as relatively free agents in the justice system, have the 
ability to exercise substantial discretion. For this reason, some scholars have 
called on prosecutors to voluntarily waive their peremptory challenges197 or 
to put in place “voluntary reforms” to minimize the government’s exercise 
of racially-focused peremptory challenges.198 One scholar notes that 
“prosecutors themselves have the institutional ability to transform 
prosecutorial culture and incentives from the inside.”199 Further, scholars 
have argued that rules of ethics and the possibility of disciplinary sanctions 
 
 197  See, e.g., Howard, supra note 158. 
 198  Burke, supra note 163, at 1471–73 (“In light of Batson’s failure to alter a stubborn 
pattern of using peremptory challenges in racialized ways, scholars have repeatedly called for 
the abolishment of peremptory challenges. But, despite criticism of the practice, every 
jurisdiction in the country continues to employ peremptory strikes. . . . Doctrinal change, rules 
of ethics, and disciplinary sanctions would not be necessary, however, if lawyers abated 
racialized jury selection through their own voluntary conduct.”); see also Howard, supra note 
158, at 372 (“The unique litigation role and ethical responsibilities of criminal prosecutors, 
however, make them particularly suited to a cost-benefit analysis of peremptory challenges.”); 
Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Stephen R. Greenwald, Harold Reynolds & Jonathan Sussman, 
Vigilante Justice: Prosecutor Misconduct in Capital Cases, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1327, 1365 
(2009) (“Ethical prosecutors, perhaps, are in the best position to prevent egregious misconduct 
by other attorneys. Thus, prosecutor offices can evaluate methods of training and supervising 
lawyers, and when a violation occurs in a specific office, that office should reassess its 
training.”). 
 199  Burke, supra note 163, at 1473. 
304 LEAK [Vol. 111 
may be successful in reducing discriminatory use of the peremptory 
challenge.200 These arguments express confidence in individual lawyers to 
abstain from violating Batson and, in simple terms, control themselves. 
However, other scholars are more wary of placing faith in the individual 
prosecutor. Some argue that the view in various Supreme Court decisions 
that prosecutors use peremptory strikes “fairly” and to “secure an impartial 
trial,” rather than to manipulate jury composition in order to obtain a 
conviction, is “unfounded.”201 Others lament the fact that “the stereotypical 
attitudes that have guided the use of the peremptory challenge have been 
difficult to change.”202 
While change at the level of the individual prosecutor or prosecutor’s 
office may have previously seemed overly optimistic, with the emergence of 
the “progressive prosecution” movement, there is reason to believe that self-
regulation could become the norm. Since 2015, many prosecutors running 
for District Attorney, State’s Attorney, and similar positions across the 
country have professed a commitment to “reducing mass incarceration, 
eliminating unwarranted racial disparities [in the criminal justice system], 
and seeking justice for all, including the accused.”203 Progressive 
prosecutors, who tend to come from more diverse backgrounds,204 typically 
emphasize that “the criminal justice system is failing to promote fairness” 
and promise to pursue justice rather than convict at all costs.205 
This movement has gained widespread support from many in the legal 
community and has brought a sense of hope that prosecutors “hold the key” 
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2021] PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES 305 
to changing the justice system for the better.206 Some support for the 
movement centers on prosecutors’ ideology and professed commitment to 
fairness and reducing racial bias.207 The shift in mindset away from focusing 
on convictions or being “tough on crime”—or rhetoric suggesting such a 
shift—inspires confidence that these prosecutors will be committed to 
implementing real policy and procedural changes while in office.208 Other 
supporters offer a hopeful view of prosecutors’ status as discretionary agents 
who can implement change faster than judges or legislators.209 For example, 
Emily Bazelon argues that reform-minded prosecutors can change the justice 
system more effectively than any other actors in the near term, given that 
they can regulate their own conduct and to some extent the conduct of other 
prosecutors.210 She explains, “While it would be nice if lawmakers and the 
courts threw themselves into fixing the criminal justice system, in the 
meantime, elections for prosecutors represent a shortcut to addressing a lot 
of dysfunction.”211 Supporters have cited policies that prosecutors have 
implemented, such as reforms to cash bail systems, reduced sentencing 
recommendations, and plea bargaining, as evidence that the movement has 
enjoyed success.212 
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However, skeptics have important concerns. First, while head 
prosecutors run for election on promises of reform, line prosecutors—who 
make up the bulk of prosecutors at trial—are influenced by institutional and 
personal factors and need not worry as much about oversight or liability for 
their actions.213 Regardless of head prosecutors’ promises to pursue justice 
rather than convictions, line prosecutors operate within an adversarial system 
and are interested in succeeding in their careers.214 Further, line prosecutors 
do not have their District Attorneys sitting over their shoulders watching 
them prosecute trials, and thus prosecutorial accountability is low.215 Because 
incentives other than the vision of reform with which newly elected 
progressive District Attorneys enter office shape line prosecutors’ conduct, 
“there is significant potential for noncompliance from those on the lower 
rungs of the hierarchy due to a lack of buy-in to the goals of the head 
prosecutor.”216 Accordingly, implementing the reforms of a head prosecutor 
may require line prosecutors to “restrain themselves in an environment in 
which they have access to nearly unlimited leverage over defendants and face 
a near-zero probability of legal liability for malicious acts.”217 
A second problem stems from the various political dynamics across 
jurisdictions, along with the fact that turnover from elections can dampen 
progressive prosecutors’ ability to make widespread and lasting change, as 
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more conservative prosecutors may take their place.218 According to Bazelon, 
approximately twelve percent of the population lives in a community with a 
District Attorney who could be considered progressive.219 While this is 
significant, not every jurisdiction welcomes progressive prosecution 
ideology.220 For example, prosecutors who ran for District Attorney on a 
progressive ideology in Sacramento and San Diego, California, lost to 
incumbent District Attorneys in those districts by a significant margin.221 To 
some, these failures “provide[] an early warning sign that the progressive 
prosecution platform may hold little currency with voters outside of a limited 
number of cities.”222 
On the other hand, progressive prosecutors have won elections in more 
conservative districts. For example, five progressive District Attorneys were 
“elected in major cities in Texas,” including Dallas and San Antonio.223 For 
example, in 2016, Kim Ogg was elected as District Attorney in Houston.224 
Once in office, Ogg supported bail reform and declined to prosecute minor 
drug offenses.225 She successfully “implemented a review system that seeks 
consensus among [prosecutors in her office] before levying capital 
charges.”226 Further, she “dismissed thirty-seven prosecutors from her office 
[and] hired a progressive defense attorney as her chief of staff.”227 Still, the 
progressive prosecution movement relies primarily on voters, who are 
“notoriously fickle.”228 For this reason, some argue that progressive 
prosecutors should not be viewed as a “one-way ratchet toward leniency,” as 
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voters may be swayed by an uptick in crime or other external events to seek 
a return to the prosecutor who promises to be tough on crime.229 
B. PROGRESSIVE PROSECUTION & THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE 
Despite its limitations, the progressive prosecution movement could 
greatly reduce the discriminatory use of the peremptory challenge and could 
therefore justify the states’ trend toward an equal allocation of peremptory 
challenges between the prosecution and defense. There are two main reasons 
for this. First, progressive prosecutors have committed to reducing racial 
biases in the criminal justice system and have the potential to increase the 
community’s perception of fairness in criminal procedure, lessening the need 
for a lower number of peremptory challenges for the prosecution. Second, 
the movement has resulted in policy changes that have made criminal 
procedure fairer. If extended to exercising peremptory challenges in a 
nondiscriminatory way, these changes could lessen the need for the safeguard 
of the defendant’s additional peremptory challenges. 
First, regarding the community’s perception of justice, progressive 
prosecutors have greater potential than their predecessors to increase 
perceived fairness. This not only applies with respect to the criminal justice 
system as a whole but also with respect to demonstrating a commitment to 
non-discrimination in criminal procedure. These prosecutors are not only 
making promises of procedural fairness—their promises are being conveyed 
directly to the public. In this way, the progressive prosecution movement has 
brought transparency to one of the least transparent electorally accountable 
positions in government.230 As journalist Sam Reisman explains, “[T]he rise 
of the progressive prosecutor represents new voter awareness about the roles 
prosecutors play in assessing what charges to bring, whether to incarcerate, 
negotiating plea deals and recommending sentencing.”231 Further, data on 
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these prosecutorial decisions, which some progressive prosecutors have 
voluntarily elected to make public, “may be used to identify patterns of 
constitutional violations and disparate treatment of defendants and/or 
victims.”232 
Awareness surrounding the progressive prosecution movement has also 
been fueled by outside forces, including educational programs by 
organizations such as the ACLU.233 As a result, there appears to be a greater 
awareness among various communities about prosecutorial elections, 
progressive prosecutors’ goals and policies, and how they are implementing 
change in the system.234 Prosecutorial transparency and a greater awareness 
of prosecutors’ commitment to ending discriminatory conduct is important 
in the context of peremptory challenges because it can increase the 
community’s confidence in and perception of prosecutorial fairness at the 
trial level. If prosecutors can be trusted to engage in conduct that is 
nondiscriminatory, then the need, at least from an “optics” standpoint, for a 
lower number of peremptory challenges than that granted to the defense is 
lessened. 
It is important to note that prosecutors have not explicitly addressed the 
issue of peremptory challenges, at least not outwardly to the public. 
However, there is evidence that progressive prosecutors have successfully 
implemented safeguards that might reduce racial biases in other areas of 
criminal procedure, which suggests that prosecutors may also have success 
in limiting the abuse of the peremptory challenge. For example, some 
prosecutors’ offices have recently added or expanded conviction integrity 
units that check line prosecutors’ work.235 This would hopefully include 
prosecutors’ jury selection and Batson records. As another example, 
Philadelphia District Attorney Larry Krasner has said, “We are not going to 
overcharge . . . . We are not going to try to coerce defendants. We are going 
to proceed on charges that are supported by the facts in the case, period.”236 
To that end, Krasner requires prosecutors “to get his approval on any plea 
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offer” that carries a prison sentence of greater than fifteen to thirty years.237 
Krasner’s efforts have had real results: the office filed “18 percent fewer 
cases than in 2017, including 25 percent fewer misdemeanors.”238 Further, 
prosecutors in his office opened 6,500 fewer cases in the year after he was 
elected to District Attorney than they opened in the previous year.239 
Similarly, Kim Foxx “issued guidelines to the prosecutors in her office, 
ordering them to proactively ask for pretrial release in appropriate cases,” 
among other reforms.240 A year after Kim Foxx entered office, “the Cook 
County jail population had decreased by more than 1,000 people.”241 
Further, two principles proposed by The Progressive Prosecutor’s 
Handbook, a guide for progressive prosecutors to navigate the difficulties of 
implementing change in their offices, 242 address Batson violations—one 
directly and one indirectly. These principles indicate that progressive 
prosecutors can implement concrete policies to eliminate abuse of the 
peremptory challenge.243 For example, the author warns that progressive 
prosecutors “[should not] countenance jokes about evading Batson” and 
should make clear to line prosecutors that procedural fairness is expected.244 
The author also suggests that progressive prosecutors hire diverse line 
prosecutors and supervisory prosecutors, as offices with a more diverse 
makeup are less likely to tolerate racism, “coded or explicit.”245 
Further, many progressive prosecutors themselves are racially and 
ethnically diverse or come from diverse backgrounds, and many have 
implemented policies to address diversity.246 For example, Kim Foxx is the 
first African-American woman to serve as District Attorney for Cook 
County, Illinois.247 Additionally, Larry Krasner, a former public defender, 
launched a nationwide effort to recruit more diverse Assistant District 
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Attorneys.248 Upon taking office, Krasner “fired 31 of the office’s 
prosecutors” and “immediately began recruiting and filling the open 
positions with lawyers who share his vision of criminal justice reform.”249 
This effort included recruiting public defenders and law students from 
historically black law schools.250 Diversity among lead and line prosecutors 
can serve the perception of the justice system as fairer for the community, 
and particularly for diverse members of the community. 
Ultimately, closer examination of empirical data will be required to 
determine whether the movement can present a solution that serves as a 
compromise between those who support an unequal number of peremptory 
challenges and those who believe the number should be equal. Thus, an 
unequal allocation of peremptory challenges should be maintained in the 
federal system and among states that have not equalized the number of 
peremptory challenges allocated between the prosecution and defense while 
awaiting evidence that progressive prosecution can justify equalization. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the peremptory challenge is a revered, yet perplexing, 
and in some corners detested, facet of the American criminal justice system. 
It is unlikely that peremptory challenges will be abolished any time soon, and 
thus, we are left to determine how to properly use and allocate them while 
maintaining fairness for the accused, victims of crimes, and the community 
at large. The arguments supplied in the 1977 debates that resulted in the 
federal system declining to allocate an equal number of peremptory 
challenges to the defense and prosecution remain relevant to the federal 
system and states today, notwithstanding the failures of Batson. At this time, 
allocating a greater number of peremptory challenges to the defense is 
necessary to maintain both the perception of fairness in the justice system 
and actual fairness in the exercise of peremptory challenges at trial. 
Accordingly, the federal system and remaining states that maintain an 
unequal number of peremptory challenges should continue to do so—at least 
for now. There is potential for the progressive prosecution movement to 
supplant the role that the unequal allocation of peremptory challenge plays 
in maintaining fairness. However, the progressive prosecution movement is 
young and it is likely too early to tell whether the movement will persist and 
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what its consequences will be.251 Thus, while the movement holds promise 
for the peremptory challenge, whether it can justify equalizing the number of 
peremptory challenges cannot yet be determined, and the legal community 
must consider further empirical evidence on its successes before making that 
decision. In the meantime, stasis is the best solution. 
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